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INTRODUCTION
While privacy laws differ in their scope, focus, and approach,
they all involve restrictions on the collection, use, sharing, or
retention of information about people. In general, privacy laws
reflect a societal consensus that privacy violations can lead to a wide
range of financial, reputational, dignitary, and other harms, and that
excessive collection and harmful uses of personal information
should therefore be constrained. These laws require organizations to
comply with a number of obligations concerning personal
information.1 In practice, these requirements can lead organizations
to refrain from collecting certain data, only use data with the consent
of the individual, or to delete data after a certain timeframe or at the
request of the individual. Further, the global trend is toward both
more and stricter privacy laws.
At the same time, scientific research is increasingly using the
tools of data analytics and machine learning. These tools rely on
“big data” and the idea that powerful computers and sophisticated
analytical tools can examine very large data sets to reveal new
insights and discoveries. Scientists believe this data-driven approach
to research will lead to stunning breakthroughs in medicine,
education, and many other fields that can dramatically advance
human knowledge and well-being.
The tension between these two trends is clear. Most privacy laws
acknowledge and address that tension. While privacy laws aim to
restrict harmful data practices, they typically also are designed to
allow for, or even encourage, uses of personal information that are
beneficial and valuable to the individual or society. The inherent
tension is often resolved by including reasonable exceptions in the
laws to allow for necessary or beneficial data uses. But these
1

For the sake of consistency, this article generally uses the term “personal
information.” Some of the laws it discusses use variations on that term, including
“personally identifiable information” or “personal data,” and those alternatives
terms may be used when referring to a specific law.
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exceptions are not complete exemptions from privacy obligations;
even such beneficial uses of personal information typically remain
subject to other protections in privacy laws such as an obligation to
maintain the security of the data.
Protecting individual privacy is an important part of any use of
personal information for research purposes. Organizations that
collect, retain, use, or share personal information to advance
scientific research should always handle that information with care,
protect it from inadvertent disclosure or misuse, and be transparent
about the use and protection of that data. But if privacy laws do not
take into account and make allowances for the beneficial uses of
personal information for research, the advancement of science, the
expansion of knowledge, and the realization of new discoveries can
be seriously impaired.
This article addresses how privacy laws can and should allow
for scientific research while still providing meaningful protections
for personal information. Part I discuses key principles found in
many privacy laws and how each can potentially impact scientific
research. Part II describes several prominent privacy laws across
different jurisdictions and how each addresses research as a type of
data use. Part III briefly discusses the distinction between academic
or public-interest research and commercial research. Finally, Part IV
provides specific recommendations to lawmakers and regulators on
how privacy law should address and accommodate scientific
research.
PART I: HOW PRIVACY LAW PRINCIPLES AFFECT RESEARCH
Privacy laws around the world reflect a common set of
principles, frequently referred to as “fair information practice
principles” or FIPPs. While there are different iterations of the
FIPPs,2 they generally include the concepts of transparency, data
2
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens (1973), at 41,
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf; OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980),
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecd
guidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm);
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minimization, choice or consent, data access, and data security.
Some or all of these principles are found in virtually every privacy
law. A number of privacy laws have expanded on these core
principles. Some have incorporated a right to data deletion as an
extension of the right to data access.3 Others have addressed the idea
of de-identification as an extension of the principles of data
minimization and data security. 4
Some of these principles and the resulting legal obligations have
little negative impact on the use and sharing of personal information
for research purposes. Transparency and data security are prime
examples, and applying them to the context of research makes good
sense and provides important protections for personal information
as it is being used for research purposes. However, other principles,
such as consent and data deletion, can create significant obstacles to
scientific research if not drafted with sensible exceptions. The
following discussion addresses each of these principles in turn.
A. Transparency
Nearly every privacy law includes some type of transparency
obligation. Often, laws set out specific notice obligations and list
the types of information that must be disclosed to individuals from
whom personal information is collected. Depending on the
applicable law, required disclosures may include descriptions of:
 the categories of personal information collected, 5

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Privacy Online: A Report to Congress
(1998),
at
7,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf);
Asia-Pacific
Economic
Cooperation
(APEC),
Privacy
Framework
(2005),
https://www.apec.org/-/media/APEC/Publications/2005/12/APEC-PrivacyFramework/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.pdf).
3
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 312.6(a)(2) (2019) (right of a parent to request deletion
of personal information collected from a child); Council Regulation 2016/679, art.
17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 43 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR] (right of erasure).
4
See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 3 at 33 (definition of pseudonymisation); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1798.140(h) (definition of deidentified).
5
California Business and Professions Code § 22575(b); GDPR, supra note 3
at 41, 43.
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the sources of personal information collected, 6
the intended uses of personal information, 7
the categories of third parties to whom personal information
is disclosed,8
 how long the personal information is retained, 9 and
 a description of the rights that individuals have with respect
to personal information, such as the right to access.10
These privacy notice disclosures are required whether or not
personal information is used or shared for research purposes. An
organization that intends to use or share data for research merely
needs to state this intention in its privacy statement. Specifically,
“research” should be included as one of the categories of data use,
and academics and other researchers should be included among the
categories of third parties to whom personal information is
disclosed.
With regard to data retention, it is generally sufficient to
describe the criteria used to determine retention timeframes, rather
than necessarily having to list specific retention schedules in a
privacy notice.11 So, it may be useful to state one of the criteria as
the period necessary to carry out legitimate scientific research.
Requiring organizations to be transparent about their use and
sharing of personal information, including sharing information with
researchers, is an important privacy protection and can promote
greater accountability.12 But these requirements do not themselves
create any significant barrier to research. At most, they require
organizations to consider and include research uses of data in the
types of data use and sharing described in the organization’s privacy
statement.

6

GDPR, supra note 3 at 42, 43.
GDPR, supra note 3 at 40, 41, 43.
8
California Business and Professions Code § 22575(b); GDPR, supra note 3
at 41, 43.
9
GDPR, supra note 3 at 41, 42, 43.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See generally Michael Hintze, In Defense of the Long Privacy Statement,
76 MD. L. REV. 1044 (2017).
7
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B. Consent or choice
Many privacy laws require consent to collect, use, or share
personal information. Depending on how the law is drafted,
interpreted, and enforced, the required consent may be either
explicit, such as requiring an affirmative opt-in choice, or implicit,
implying consent based on a failure to opt-out or on some other
basis. Implicit consent may be a fairly low bar. For example, it may
be achieved merely by informing individuals of a particular data use
and implying consent based on their continued use of a product or
service. Increasingly, privacy laws are raising the bar for adequate
consent, requiring explicit consent in some cases. However,
obtaining explicit consent can be difficult; and in research, big data
analytics, and machine learning scenarios, obtaining explicit
consent may be impractical or impossible.
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that seeking and obtaining
consent to have personal information included in a research study
can result in a biased data sample and affect the outcome of the
research.13 An opt-in or explicit consent requirement is very likely
to result in a non-representative sample and therefore bias the results
of the research. But in many cases, even providing the ability to optout could significantly affect the data in undesirable ways.
Separate from the concerns regarding consent bias, researchers
have also raised concerns that stringent requirements to obtain
consent for accessing data for research purposes can lead to
insufficient sample sizes, delay, and other costs that can interfere
with efforts to produce timely and useful research results.14
Thus, the potential for consent requirements to negatively affect
scientific research is quite high. Fortunately, as described in Part II,
many privacy laws provide exceptions or alternatives to consent
when it comes to using data for research.
13

See Khaled El Emam et al., A Review of Evidence on Consent Bias in
Research, 13 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS, 42 (2013),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15265161.2013.767958; Michelle
E. Kho et al., Written Informed Consent and Selection Bias in Observational
Studies Using Medical Records: Systematic Review, BMJ 338:b866 (March 12,
2009), https://doi.org/10.1136bmj.b866.
14
See, e.g., Douglas B. McCarthy et al., Medical Records and Privacy:
Empirical Effects of Legislation, 34 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 417 (April
1999).
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C. Right to Access
Another principle that is commonly reflected in privacy laws is
an individual’s right to access personal information about them
being held by an organization. This right is closely related to the
principle of transparency, as it enables an individual to learn not just
what personal information the organization collects in general, but
to know specifically what personal information the organization has.
But because the right of access can result in specific information
about an individual being released, it is important that the
organization be able to authenticate and verify that the person
making the request is the correct person to whom the data relates.
The right of access typically would not directly interfere with
research uses of data, so the potential impact is relatively low. But
like other privacy principles, it can add compliance obligations and
resulting costs and overhead; organizations that use or share
personal information for research purposes must take this into
account.
For instance, while some examples of the right to access are
limited to accessing the personal information itself, others give
individuals the right to obtain other details, such as the third parties
with whom personal information is shared. Under most privacy laws
that include such requirements, limiting that disclosure to the
categories of third parties will suffice.15 In such cases, it will be
quite easy for organizations that share personal information for
research purposes to add “academic researchers” to their list of
third-party recipients of personal information. This is similar to what
should be done to meet transparency obligations.
But a few laws may require more granular disclosures to
individuals who make an access requests, at least under certain
circumstances. For example, under the newly-enacted California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), if the sharing of personal
information with a researcher could be characterized as a “sale,” a
response to an access request may need to be more specific. Rather
than just stating a category of third-party recipients, the response to
15
See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 3 at 43 (“[T]he recipients or categories of
recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed”).
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the access request would need to be clear about whether or not
personal information about the specific requesting individual has
been shared with researchers, and/or identify the specific third
parties that have received the individual’s personal information. 16
Thus, organizations subject to such requirements should track and
documents whose information is shared for research purposes and
which third-party researchers or research organizations have
received it, and be able to produce that data upon request.
Finally, because an individual’s right to access can be asserted
against recipients of personal information in many cases,
researchers receiving the data could be subject to access requests.
These data–receiving organizations should be prepared to respond
to access requests under the applicable laws.
D. Right to delete
While less common than a right to access, an increasing number
of privacy laws have added a right to delete, enabling individuals to
request that organizations delete personal information about them.17
Similar to the potential problems described relating to consent, an
unchecked right to delete can create serious barriers to research.
As with consent, enabling individuals to selectively remove
themselves from research by deleting their personal information can
cause bias in the data sample, lead to smaller sample sizes, and
impose additional costs and burdens on research.
For example, if a study is underway and one or more individuals
demand removal of their personal information that is part of that
study, that research could be derailed. Further, even if the deletion
could be delayed until the completion of the study, it could still harm
scientific research. A hallmark of good science is that results be
testable and replicable. However, if individuals are able to later
16

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.115(a)(2) (“The categories of personal information
that the business sold about the consumer and the categories of third parties to
whom the personal information was sold, by category or categories of personal
information for each third party to whom the personal information was sold.”)
(emphasis added).
17
GDPR, supra note 3 at 43-44 (EU); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018); 34 C.F.R. § 312.6(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 4,012
(January 17, 2013) (giving parents the right to request deletion of personal
information collected online from children under the age of thirteen).
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remove their personal information from a data set that underlies a
study, the ability to test and replicate that study could be
significantly undermined.
Most privacy laws that include a right to delete include a number
of exceptions, including where the data is needed for research. Such
exceptions are essential to enable beneficial uses of personal
information for scientific research.
E. Data Minimization
Data minimization is a somewhat amorphous principle that
encompasses several ideas. One aspect of data minimization is the
idea of collection limitation—don’t collect more personal
information than is reasonably needed to accomplish the purpose(s)
for which it is collected. Another aspect is retention limitation—
don’t keep data longer than is reasonably needed to accomplish the
purpose(s) for which it was collected. A related concept is that data
can and should be made less sensitive through techniques such as
de-identification (e.g., removing, masking, or altering data elements
that can identify an individual) or reducing the precision of data
(such as converting a precise GPS location point to zip-code level
data).
Many privacy laws include some notion of data minimization.18
This principle creates obvious tensions with the big data analytics
and machine learning that underlie much scientific research today.
The promise of big data is that applying massive computing power
to very large data sets can reveal unexpected patterns, correlations,
and connections within the data and result in surprising new insights
and discoveries. At least in theory, the more data the researchers
have, the more unanticipated breakthroughs are likely to emerge.
The combination of the ideas that “more data is better” and that the
outcomes are unknowable until the research occurs make it difficult
to apply legal principles that suggest less data is better and that the
purposes of the data should be established up front.
But this is a tension, not necessarily a conflict. As with the
transparency principle, it is important to articulate up front, at least
18
GDPR, supra note 3, arts. 5(1)(c) (collection limitation), 5(1)(e) (retention
limitation) at 35-36 (EU); 34 C.F.R. § 312.7 (collection limitation), § 312.10
(retention limitation), 78 Fed. Reg. 4,012 (January 17, 2013).

112
14:2

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL.

in general terms, that research is one of the anticipated purposes for
the data. By establishing this purpose at the outset, the amount of
data collected, the length of retention, and the level of precision and
identifiability maintained can take the anticipated research purposes
into account. Beyond that, organizations should still be thoughtful
about the data they collect and retain. If data is stale or unreliable,
and as a result very unlikely to be useful for research, it should not
be retained. If some level of de-identification is compatible with the
research uses of the personal information, the compatible deidentification should be employed.
As with other aspects of data protection, data minimization can
be thought of as a risk reduction principle and should be considered
carefully along with other compliance measures. It is likely
inevitable that any application of data minimization could
potentially have some negative impact on research, but if carefully
employed, an appropriate balance can be found and those impacts
may be limited to the margins. To enable that balance, data
minimization should be reflected in privacy laws as a flexible
concept that can allow for broad use of data for scientific research.
F. Data Security
Another common element among privacy laws is an obligation
to implement appropriate data security measures.19 Typically (and
ideally), data security obligations are drafted to create a flexible set
of requirements that are not overly proscriptive and take into
account the context, nature, and sensitivity of the personal
information in question.
Responsible organizations that handle large amounts of personal
information typically invest heavily in data security for their core
systems, such as firewalls, access controls, encryption, and intrusion
detection. But research uses of data may involve moving data into
different systems in a different environment such as a university or
a research lab. When using or sharing personal information for
19

GDPR, supra note 3 at 51-52 (EU); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104-191 (Security Rule at 45
C.F.R. Part 160 and Subparts A and C of Part 164); 34 C.F.R. § 312.8, 78 Fed.
Reg. 4,012 (January 17, 2013).

2019]

SCIENCE AND PRIVACY

113

research purposes, it is important to ensure that all systems on which
the data is stored maintain the appropriate level of data security.
Doing so may require the performance of due diligence to ensure the
destinations systems are secure, and if those systems fall short, there
will likely be additional costs incurred from upgrading existing
security protections or finding alternative data storage
arrangements. But those are steps that should be taken in any case,
and the costs are likely to pale in comparison to the costs of a
security breach affecting personal information.
Thus, while data security requirements can create costs, those
costs should be seen as prudent investments, and the requirements
do not themselves create a legal barrier to using or sharing data for
research purposes. They are an appropriate and important part of any
privacy law.
G. De-identification
De-identification is a process by which personal information is
manipulated in ways designed to make it more difficult to
subsequently re-identify an individual from that data. It can involve
a wide range of techniques. And there is a range of resulting
strengths of de-identification, from relatively weak methods where
the risk of re-identification is high, to very strong methods where
the data can be considered irreversibly anonymized.
De-identification is relevant for compliance with nearly every
privacy law. In some cases, de-identification is not explicitly
mentioned, but it is implicit in the scope of the law. Most privacy
laws are scoped to a defined set of “personal information.” And if
data can be strongly de-identified to the extent it no longer meets the
law’s definition of personal information, it will almost always fall
outside the scope of the privacy law. As a result, research on
strongly de-identified data can typically proceed without further
privacy compliance obligations.
A number of privacy laws explicitly incorporate notions of deidentification as a way to meet some or all of the law’s requirements.
For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule includes a detailed set of criteria
regarding de-identification that enable de-identified data to fall
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outside the scope of the Rule.20 In Europe, the GDPR recognizes a
range of de-identification methods and strengths and provides
regulatory incentives for different levels of de-identification. 21
But while de-identification is included in a number of privacy
laws, none have a blanket requirement that data be de-identified.
Such a blanket rule would be unworkable, because there are many
contexts in which de-identification of data would be incompatible
with the intended uses of the data. And as a general rule, the stronger
the de-identification, the lower the utility of the data. With some
research, de-identification can be a practical and advisable option,
but not in all cases.
Rather than absolute rules, privacy laws typically create
incentives to de-identify data, and thereby encourage the use of
techniques that can reduce risk in context where de-identification is
a practical option. When properly drafted, these laws can encourage
best practices to reduce privacy risks, while not imposing barriers to
scientific research.
H. Summary
The following chart summarizes the likelihood of negative
impacts on scientific research for each of these principles.
Principle
Transparency
Consent or choice
Right to access
Right to delete
Data minimization
Data security
20

Likelihood of Negative
Impact
Low
High
Low
High
Medium
Low

45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a)–(b) (2018).
GDPR, supra note 3, Recital 26 at 5 (EU) (discussing concepts of personal
data and anonymous data); id. arts. 4(1) (definition of personal data), 4(5)
(definition of pseudonymization) at 33; id. art. 11 (processing which does not
require identification) at 39. See Michael Hintze, Viewing the GDPR through a
De-Identification Lens: A Tool for Compliance, Clarification, and Consistency, 8
INT’L DATA PROTECTION L. 86 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909121.
21
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Low

PART II: HOW EXISTING PRIVACY LAWS TREAT RESEARCH
As suggested in Part I above, different privacy laws treat
research uses of personal information differently. Some address
research in a thoughtful and flexible manner, creating appropriate
exceptions for research that allow and encourage scientific research
to flourish. Others, either by design or oversight, have been less
friendly to research. In this Part, several prominent privacy laws are
examined in terms of how they treat scientific research.
A. Europe: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a
comprehensive privacy law that applies across the European Union
(EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). It also has been
highly influential globally, with countries around the world adopting
privacy laws based on the European model.
The GDPR incorporates the full range of principles discussed in
Part I of this article, including data minimization, consent, and
deletion rights, all of which can cause problems for beneficial
research uses of personal data. However, the drafters of the GDPR
included thoughtful exceptions and allowances for research that
enable personal data to be used and shared for such purposes without
serious impediment.
Consent is addressed in the GDPR in a unique way. The law
sets a very high bar for consent. Under the GDPR, consent must be
“freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous” and manifested
through “a statement or by a clear affirmative action” indicating the
data subject’s agreement.22 Obviously, obtaining such consent
would create a significant barrier for research uses of personal data.
However, consent is not always required. Rather, under the GDPR,
processing personal data requires a legal basis. 23 There are several
different legal bases available under the law, only one of which is
22
23

GDPR, supra note 3 at 34 (EU).
Id. art. 6 at 36.
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the consent of the data subject.24 Other common legal bases include
where the processing is “necessary for the performance of a contract
to which the data subject is party,”25 or if the “legitimate interests”
of the data controller or a third party outweighs the interests or rights
of the data subject.26
Further, the GDPR specifies that if there is a legal basis for the
original purpose of collecting the personal data, a secondary use of
that data need not have a separate legal basis if that use is
“compatible” with the purpose for which the data was collected.
Recital 50 of the GDPR helpfully notes that scientific research is
such a compatible purpose:
The processing of personal data for purposes other than
those for which the personal data were initially collected
should be allowed only where the processing is compatible
with the purposes for which the personal data were initially
collected. In such a case, no legal basis separate from that
which allowed the collection of the personal data is required
. . . . Further processing for archiving purposes in the public
interest, scientific or historical research purposes or
statistical purposes should be considered to be compatible
lawful processing operations.27
This language is reflected in Article 5 which provides that:
[Personal data shall be] collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner
that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing
for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or
historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in
accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be
incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose
limitation’).28

24

Id. art. 6(1)(a) at. 36.
Id. art. 6(1)(b) at 36.
26
Id. art. 6(1)(f) at 36.
27
Id. Recital 50 at 9.
28
Id. art. 5(1)(b) at 35.
25
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The reference to Article 89(1) suggests that there are certain
conditions that must be met in order for scientific research to be
considered a compatible purpose, requiring no additional legal basis.
Those conditions come down to there being “appropriate
safeguards” in place designed to protect privacy and individual
rights:
Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest,
scientific or historical research purposes or statistical
purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in
accordance with this Regulation, for the rights and freedoms
of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that
technical and organisational measures are in place in
particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of data
minimisation.
Those
measures
may
include
pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be
fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be
fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no
longer permits the identification of data subjects, those
purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner. 29
Likewise, Article 6(4) re-iterates the need for “appropriate
safeguards” where the secondary use is based on the use being
“compatible” with the original purpose of collection:
Where the processing for a purpose other than that for which
the personal data have been collected is not based on the data
subject's consent [or a legal requirement], the controller
shall, in order to ascertain whether processing for another
purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the
personal data are initially collected, take into account, inter
alia . . . the possible consequences of the intended further
processing for data subjects [and] the existence of
appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or
pseudonymisation.30

29
30

Id. art. 89(1) at 84.
Id. art. 6(4) at 37.
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There are conflicting readings of some of the relevant provisions
cited above, particularly with respect to scenarios where the original
legal basis for collecting and using the data was the consent of the
data subject. One potential issue arises from the fact that where the
original legal basis is consent, the GDPR gives the data subject the
right to withdraw consent;31 if this right is exercised, the
compatibility analysis may no longer be available. However, the
withdrawal of consent is not retroactive, so at most it would affect
only future research that commences after the withdrawal of consent
for the original purpose. The European Commission published brief
(and non-binding) guidance that goes even further, suggesting that
the compatibility analysis for secondary uses of data is never
allowed where the original legal basis is consent,32 however that
conclusion appears to be based on a misreading of Article 6(4),
quoted above.33
31

Id. art. 7(3) at 37.
See Eur. Comm’n, Can We Use Data for Another Purpose?,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-businessand-organisations/principles-gdpr/purpose-data-processing/can-we-use-dataanother-purpose_en (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (“If your company/organisation
has collected data on the basis of legitimate interest, a contract or vital
interests it can be used for another purpose but only after checking that the new
purpose is compatible with the original purpose. . . . If your
company/organisation has collected the data on the basis of consent or following
a legal requirement, no further processing beyond what is covered by the original
consent or the provisions of the law is possible. Further processing would require
obtaining new consent or a new legal basis.”).
33
Article 6(4) is a long sentence and a bit difficult to parse on an initial
reading. But the subject of the sentence is “processing for a purpose other than
that for which the personal data have been collected” – in other words a
“secondary purpose.” So that provision says, in effect, “Where [a secondary
purpose] is not based on [consent or a legal requirement], the controller shall, in
order to ascertain whether [the secondary purpose] is compatible with the
[primary purpose], take into account . . .” In other words, unless the secondary
purpose has a legal basis of consent or is a legal requirement, it is necessary to do
the compatibility analysis. Conversely, if a secondary use is based on consent or
a legal requirement, it is not necessary to do a compatibility analysis. That
conclusion makes sense and reflects a sound policy. Conversely, Article 6(4) does
not appear to say, as the Commission guidance seems to suggest, that if the
collection and primary use is based on consent or a legal requirement, the
compatibility analysis is unavailable or irrelevant, and any secondary use is
prohibited unless there is a separate legal basis. Such a surprising conclusion does
32
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Regardless, even if a separate legal basis is required for a
secondary research use of personal data, the GDPR also offers a
practical solution with the availability of “legitimate interests” as a
legal basis. This legal basis is available where the “processing is
necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of
the data subject which require protection of personal data.” 34 Thus,
relying on the legitimate interests basis for scientific research
requires balancing the benefits and interests in doing the research
against the risks to the rights and freedoms of the individual. The
benefits side of the equation is not limited to the interests of the
organizations using or sharing the personal information for research
purposes, but can also take into account the interests of any third
party—including the public interest and benefits of the research.
And on the risk side of the equation, unlike uses of data that directly
impact the data subject, such as marketing, advertising,
personalization, or other individualized decision-making, research
typically does not have a direct impact on the individual data
subjects. Moreover, if additional privacy protections are in place,
such as the “appropriate safeguards” noted above, the balancing test
will almost always come out in favor of being able to rely on
legitimate interests as a legal basis for using personal data to conduct
scientific research.
Based on these provisions, scientific research is almost certain
to be considered a purpose “compatible” with the purpose(s) for
which the data was originally collected, requiring no additional legal
basis. To the extent that an additional legal basis may be needed,
scientific research is almost certain to be eligible for the legitimate
interests basis. Both of those approaches, however, require that
appropriate safeguards be in place to protect the privacy and rights
of the individuals whose personal data is being used.
The references to “appropriate safeguards” include deidentification as a key example of the measures organizations
engaged in research can take to protect privacy and the rights of the
data subjects. But it is not a mandate. Rather, de-identification need
not seem to be supported by the text of the law.
34
GDPR, supra note 3 at 36.
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only be applied to the extent compatible with the research needs.
But if de-identification would reduce the utility of the data for the
intended research purpose, it need not be applied (but other
safeguards, such as strong security, should be in place). In any case,
the organizations involved in research need to demonstrate that they
have applied “appropriate safeguards” and that the likelihood of
negative consequences on the data subject is low.
The GDPR also includes data minimization principles, including
retention limitations which may be in tension with the idea that
researchers need to gather and retain large volumes of data to
conduct big data analytics tools and machine learning. However, the
retention limitation principle in the GDPR includes a specific carveout for research:
Personal data shall be: . . . kept in a form which permits
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary
for the purposes for which the personal data are processed;
personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the
personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes
in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article
89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate technical
and organisational measures required by this Regulation in
order to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data
subject.35
Finally, the GDPR provides for a limited right for individuals to
request the deletion of personal data.36 But that right only applies
under certain specified instances. One instance is when the data
subject withdraws consent and there is no other legal ground for
processing.37 Thus, if the research is based on the consent of the data
subject (or if it is based on being compatible with the original
purpose of collection, which was based on the consent of the data
subject), and the data subject subsequently withdraws that consent,
the data subject may have a right to have the data deleted. However,
the right to delete in that case would apply only if there is no other
35

Id. art. 5(1)(e) at 36.
Id. art. 17 at 43.
37
Id. art. 17(1)(b) at 44.
36
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legal basis for continued processing. As discussed above, scientific
research is very likely to have a separate legal basis of legitimate
interests. But more importantly, the exceptions to the right of erasure
specifically reference research uses of data:
Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that
processing is necessary: . . . (d) for archiving purposes in the
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or
statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) in so far
as the right referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to render
impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the
objectives of that processing.38
Thus, while research uses of personal data do not create an
absolute exception to the right of erasure, a data processor can refuse
an erasure request following a withdrawal of consent if it can either
(1) establish an alternate legal basis, such as legitimate interests, or
(2) demonstrate that deletion of the data related to the data subject
will seriously impair the research objective.
Thus, while the GDPR includes principles such as consent, data
minimization, and a right to delete that can potentially impede
research uses of data, it also provides flexibility and exceptions that
should allow research to flourish. Where obtaining explicit consent
from each individual data subject is often impractical and could
undermine the statistical validity of outcomes, the GDPR provides
practical alternatives to consent. Data controllers conducting
research on data have a strong case under the GDPR for relying on
a legal basis other than consent, such as legitimate interests.
Alternatively, data controllers need not have an additional legal
basis at all if the secondary purpose is “compatible” with the original
purpose of collection, and the GDPR specifies that research is a
compatible purpose. And research is called out explicitly as an
exception to retention limitation and the right to delete.
B. Canada: Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (PIPEDA)

38

Id. art. 17(3) at 44.
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In Canada, PIPEDA is another comprehensive privacy law that
includes a range of principles including transparency, retention
limitation, right of access, and data security. It generally requires
notice and consent for uses and disclosures of personal
information.39 However, the law permits disclosures of personal
information for “scholarly study or research” without notice or
consent if:




the purposes cannot be achieved without the use or
disclosure of the information,
it is impracticable to obtain consent, and
the organization provides prior notice to the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada.40

The exemption from consent requirements for research is
common in privacy laws, but the requirement to inform the regulator
when an organization seeks to use that exemption is unique to
PIPEDA.
The retention limitation principle in PIPEDA is tied to the
transparency principle. It provides that “[p]ersonal information that
is no longer required to fulfil the identified purposes should be
destroyed, erased, or made anonymous.”41 Thus, if research is one
of the identified purposes, the retention limitation provision should
allow for the retention of data for as long as needed for research.
C. United States: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA)
The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to protected health
information (PHI), and provides detailed regulations reflecting a
broad range of principles. It also specifically addresses the use and
39
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000,
c 5 sch 1 cl 4.3 (Can.).
40
Id. s 7(3)(f); see also id. s 7(2)(c) (outlining a similar exception to notice
and consent for uses of personal information for research purposes, which
includes the same three conditions that apply to disclosures, plus that the
information be “used in a manner that will ensure its confidentiality.”).
41
Id. sch 1 cl 4.5.3.
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disclosure of PHI for research purposes. 42
The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines research fairly broadly as “a
systematic investigation, including research development, testing,
and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge.”43 Notably, it does not limit research to medical or
health research.
PHI can be used for research purposes under several different
circumstances. First, if the data to be used for research meets the
HIPAA standards for de-identification (based either on the safe
harbor method or the expert determination method), then the data is
no longer PHI subject to the Privacy Rule and it can be freely
disclosed for research (or any other) purposes. 44
Second, PHI can be used or disclosed for research purposes with
the individual’s authorization (i.e. with consent). 45
Third, PHI can be used or disclosed for research purposes
without the individual’s authorization if there is a documented
waiver approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) or Privacy
Board.46 The IRB or Privacy Board can be that of the covered entity
making the disclosure of PHI, the recipient researcher, or an
independent board.47
Fourth, limited sets of PHI (which means that certain direct
identifiers have been removed, although the data is not fully deidentified as defined by the Rule) can be disclosed to a researcher

42

A useful overview of how HIPAA addresses research uses of personal
information
can
be
found
at:
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/special-topics/research/index.html.
43
45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2018).
44
Id. § 164.514(a)-(c).
45
See generally id. § 164.508 (regarding individual authorization for uses or
disclosures of PHI); id. § 164.508(b)(3)(i) (permitting authorization for research
purposes to be combined under certain circumstances); id. § 508(b)(4)(1)
(allowing a covered health care provider to “condition the provision of researchrelated treatment on provision of an authorization for the use or disclosure of
protected health information for such research.”).
46
Id. § 164.512(i)(1).
47
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., HIPAA FAQs for Professionals,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/310/does-hipaa-require-acovered-entity-to-create-an-irb-or-privacy-board/index.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2019).
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pursuant to a data use agreement. 48
Additionally, the HIPAA Privacy Rule also allows the use and
disclosures of PHI of decedents for research purposes. 49 The Rule
also allows for researchers to access PHI (including remote access)
for purposes that are preparatory to research (such as designing a
study or preparing a research protocol).50
Finally, certain disclosures of PHI for research purposes are
subject to an individual’s right to receive an accounting of such
disclosures that occurred over the last six years. Thus, covered
entities must ensure that such disclosures are well-documented in a
way that would enable them to respond to these types of requests
from individuals.
The level of specific detail regarding research uses and
disclosures of data in HIPAA is well beyond that found in any other
privacy law. Despite the rigor of these requirements, and the
sensitivity of the personal information involved, they provide
significant flexibility to enable scientific research. As a result, some
elements of the HIPAA privacy rule may be useful to consider in
using personal information for research beyond the health context.
D. United States: Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA)
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act is a U.S. federal
law that applies to schools that receive federal funding. 51 It includes
several privacy principles that apply to student records. FERPA
gives parents (and students who are 18 years old or over) the right
to access student records, and it requires their consent for certain
disclosures of educational records.
However, consent is not always required. Under FERPA,
48

45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2018). Templates for such data use agreements are
available from various sources. For example, the Health Care Systems Research
Network (HCSRN) has published a tool kit and templates for data use agreements
at http://www.hcsrn.org/en/Tools%20&%20Materials/GrantsContracting/.
49
Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii).
50
Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii).
51
Useful information and resources related to FERPA can be found at
https://ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/ and https://ferpasherpa.org/.
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schools and other educational institutions can disclose personal
information related to students for research purposes under any of
the following conditions:
 With the consent of the parent—or the consent of the student
if the student is 18 years old (or older) or attending a postsecondary education institution.52
 The personally identifiable information is limited to
“directory information.”53
 The personally identifiable information is de-identified
through the “removal of all personally identifiable
information” and a “reasonable determination” that no
student is identifiable from the data alone or in combination
with “other reasonably available information.” 54
 The personally identifiable information is de-identified
through key-coding (i.e. a reversable method of deidentification) if the purpose of the research is “education
research.”55
 The disclosure to a third-party organization conducting
studies, on behalf of educational agencies or institutions and
pursuant to a written agreement, designed to (A) develop,
validate, or administer predictive tests; (B) administer
student aid programs; or (C) improve instruction.56
The written agreement required for the “studies exception” must
include certain specific terms as follows:
(1) Specifies the purpose, scope, and duration of the study
52

34 C.F.R. § 99.30 (2018).
Id. §§ 99.31(a)(11), 99.37. “‘Directory information’ means information
contained in an education record of a student that would not generally be
considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed. . . . Directory
information includes, but is not limited to, the student's name; address; telephone
listing; electronic mail address; photograph; date and place of birth; major field
of study; grade level; enrollment status (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full-time
or part-time); dates of attendance; participation in officially recognized activities
and sports; weight and height of members of athletic teams; degrees, honors and
awards received; and the most recent educational agency or institution attended.”
34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
54
Id. § 99.31(b)(1).
55
Id. § 99.31(b)(2).
56
Id. § 99.31(a)(6).
53
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or studies and the information to be disclosed;
(2) Requires the organization to use personally identifiable
information from education records only to meet the
purpose or purposes of the study as stated in the written
agreement;
(3) Requires the organization to conduct the study in a
manner that does not permit personal identification of
parents and students, as defined in this part, by anyone
other than representatives of the organization with
legitimate interests; and
(4) Requires the organization to destroy or return to the
educational agency or institution all personally
identifiable information when the information is no
longer needed for the purposes for which the study was
conducted and specifies the time period in which the
information must be returned or destroyed. 57
These exceptions to consent for certain research purposes under
FERPA are narrower than a general research exception. Disclosures
for “education research” purposes are given more favorable
treatment. But research for other purposes can occur if, for example,
the student records are strongly de-identified.
E. United States: Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA)
COPPA is another U.S. federal privacy law that applies to
personal information collected from children. 58 It requires operators
of online services to obtain verifiable parental consent prior to the
online collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from
children under the age of thirteen.59 It gives parents the right to
access and delete children’s personal information. 60 And it includes
requirements for data minimization (collection limitations),
57

Id. § 99.31(a)(6)(iii)(C).
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (Pub.L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681-728, enacted
October 21, 1998), implementing regulations at 16 C.F.R. Part 312.
59
16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a) (2019), 78 Fed. Reg. 4,011 (January 17, 2013).
60
Id. § 312.6, at 4,012.
58

2019]

SCIENCE AND PRIVACY

127

transparency, and reasonable security procedures.61 COPPA is
unusual among privacy laws in that it does not have any particular
carve-out for uses and/or disclosures of personal information for
research purposes.
Prior to 2013, the impact of COPPA on research would have
been lower due to the fact that it had a relatively narrow definition
of “personal information.”62 Thus, through reasonable deidentification, data could be taken outside the scope of personal
information as defined by COPPA, and therefore no longer
subjected to its requirements, including parental consent and the
right to delete. But through its rulemaking authority, the Federal
Trade Commission expanded the definition of personal information
in 2013 to include, among other data types, any persistent identifier
“that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different
website or online services;” “a photograph, video, or audio file,
where such file contains a child’s image or voice;” and precise
geolocation information.63 This broader definition of personal
information means that it will be more difficult to de-identify the
data such that it is no longer within the scope of the law.
The rigor of the parental consent requirement under COPPA,
and the lack of an exception for research, undoubtedly reflects the
notion that higher levels of privacy protections are appropriate when
it comes to young children. However, the downside of this approach
is that it could impair scientific research that could benefit children.
61

Id. § 312.7, at 4,012 (collection limitations), § 312.4, at 4,010
(transparency), § 312.8, at 4,012 (security).
62
“Personal information means individually identifiable information about
an individual collected online, including: (a) A first and last name; (b) A home or
other physical address including street name and name of a city or town; (c) An
e-mail address or other online contact information, including but not limited to an
instant messaging user identifier, or a screen name that reveals an individual’s email address; (d) A telephone number; (e) A Social Security number; (f) A
persistent identifier, such as a customer number held in a cookie or a processor
serial number, where such identifier is associated with individually identifiable
information; or a combination of a last name or photograph of the individual with
other information such that the combination permits physical or online contacting;
or (g) Information concerning the child or the parents of that child that the operator
collects online from the child and combines with an identifier described in this
definition.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2019), 64 Fed. Reg. 59,912 (November 3, 1999).
63
16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2019), 78 Fed. Reg. 4,009 (January 17, 2013).
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Organizations that wish to use or disclose personal information
collected from children under the age of thirteen will have to obtain
parental consent. Thus, research uses and disclosures should be
included in the scope of consent obtained from parents with the
original collection of the personal information.
An additional complication with regard to getting consent for
research purposes is that COPPA also includes a requirement that
parents are offered the opportunity to provide consent to the
collection and use of personal information, but not to the disclosure
of such information.64 This “limited consent” option means that if
an organization wishes to share with researchers the personal
information collected from children under thirteen, it cannot
combine the parental consent for such sharing with the parental
consent for the original collection—or at least it must offer the
parents to option to opt-out from the sharing of the personal
information.
F. California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)
The new California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) will come
into effect on January 1, 2020. Many critics have raised concerns
regarding the numerous ambiguities and inconsistencies in the law
that have created great uncertainty about how the CCPA will be
interpreted and enforced. There is some hope that the statute will be
further amended to clarify certain aspects of the law or that the
California Attorney General will develop regulations or guidelines
that will increase clarity. Nevertheless, significant ambiguity is
likely to remain for the foreseeable future, and despite those
problems, companies need to take steps to attempt to come into
compliance the best they can by the end of 2019.
In contrast to the GDPR, the CCPA does not require consent or
an alternate legal basis for all collection and use of personal
information. Nor does it have a general data minimization
obligation. Instead, it is focused primarily on giving consumers the
right to opt-out from “sales” of personal information,65 giving users
64
65

16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(2) (2019).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120.
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broad data access, correction, and deletion rights,66 and imposing
additional transparency obligations on companies. 67 Thus, there is
no general obligation on companies to get consent or establish an
alternative basis for sharing data with researchers—unless that
sharing could be characterized as a “sale” of data.
However, if the transfer of data for research purpose is
considered a “sale” of personal information, that transfer will be
highly regulated and the CCPA will impose a number of proscriptive
obligations. The definition of “sale” is very broad and includes any
transfer of data for “consideration” (which can be interpreted to
cover many or most commercial transactions involving data
transfers).68 The breadth of that definition puts at least some data
sharing for research purposes at risk, particularly where a
commercial entity is sharing data and expects to obtain some
commercial benefit from the resulting research. Other sharing of
personal information for research purposes would likely not cross
the line into being a data “sale,” particularly if the sharing is with
academic researchers and there is not a direct commercial benefit
expected. Thus, the risk of the sharing being deemed a “sale” is a
factor worth considering when making arrangements to share data
for research purposes, and it may be worth explicitly stating in the
data sharing agreement that no consideration is being provided for
the transfer of the data.
The CCPA also includes a right for individuals to request the
deletion of personal information.69 The impact of this right is likely
to be quite limited, however, because there are many exceptions
such that companies will be able to decline a request to delete
information in most cases. For instance, personal information can be
retained, despite a deletion request from an individual, if the
information is necessary to provide a service requested or
reasonably anticipated by the individual,70 for security purposes,71
66

Id. §§ 1798.105, 1798.110, 1798.115.
Id. §§ 1798.100(b), 1798.105(b),
1798.130(a)(5), 1798.135(a)(2).
68
Id. § 1798.140(t).
69
Id. § 1798.105.
70
Id. § 1798.105(d)(1).
71
Id. § 1798.105(d)(2).
67

1798.110(c),

1798.115(c),
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or to use the data internally for purposes that are “reasonably aligned
with the expectations of the consumer based on the consumer’s
relationship with the business”72 or “compatible with the context in
which the consumer provided the information.”73 It is hard to
imagine a scenario in which a business couldn’t credibly claim that
one or more of those exceptions apply. And if the personal
information can be retained for one of those broad purposes, there is
nothing in the CCPA preventing that retained information from also
being used for research purposes.
It is worth noting that in addition to those broad exceptions to
the right to delete, there is also a very narrow exception that is
specific to certain types of scientific research. But it is so narrow
and confusingly drafted that it is less likely to be useful for research
than the broader, more general exceptions. Specifically, the research
exception to the right of deletion only applies to research that is:
[P]ublic or peer-reviewed scientific, historical, or statistical
research in the public interest that adheres to all other
applicable ethics and privacy laws, when the businesses’
deletion of the information is likely to render impossible or
seriously impair the achievement of such research, if the
consumer has provided informed consent. 74
Further, “research” is a defined term under the CCPA, and the
definition reinforces the idea that it must be for the public interest.
And it also sets out several other (somewhat redundant) criteria,
including that the research be for non-commercial purposes and that
the data must be de-identified:
“Research” means scientific, systematic study and
observation, including basic research or applied research that
is in the public interest and that adheres to all other
applicable ethics and privacy laws or studies conducted in
the public interest in the area of public health. Research with
personal information that may have been collected from a
consumer in the course of the consumer’s interactions with
72

Id. § 1798.105(d)(7).
Id. § 1798.105(d)(9).
74
Id. § 1798.105(d)(6).
73

2019]

SCIENCE AND PRIVACY

131

a business’s service or device for other purposes shall be:
(1) Compatible with the business purpose for which the
personal information was collected.
(2) Subsequently pseudonymized and deidentified, or
deidentified and in the aggregate, such that the information
cannot reasonably identify, relate to, describe, be capable of
being associated with, or be linked, directly or indirectly, to
a particular consumer.
(3) Made subject to technical safeguards that prohibit
reidentification of the consumer to whom the information
may pertain.
(4) Subject to business processes that specifically
prohibit reidentification of the information.
(5) Made subject to business processes to prevent
inadvertent release of deidentified information.
(6) Protected from any reidentification attempts.
(7) Used solely for research purposes that are compatible
with the context in which the personal information was
collected.
(8) Not be used for any commercial purpose.
(9) Subjected by the business conducting the research to
additional security controls [that] limit access to the research
data to only those individuals in a business as are necessary
to carry out the research purpose.75
There is significant ambiguity in this definition, indicative of the
generally poor drafting of the CCPA. For instance, in the sentence
preceding the nine conditions included in the definition, the subject
of that sentence is “research.” But several of the nine conditions that
apply to that subject make little sense as a condition on research, but
rather seem to have been drafted as a condition on “personal
information.” For instance, requiring that personal information be
de-identified makes sense, but that’s not what this definition
requires. Instead, it says that the “research . . . shall
be . . . subsequently pseudonymized and deidentified . . . [and]
protected from any reidentification attempts.” 76 Does this mean that
75
76

Id. § 1798.140(s).
Id. § 1798.140(s)(2), (6).
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the input (i.e. the personal information) need not be de-identified,
but that the output of the research must be? The clumsy drafting
makes this a legitimate question for which there is no clear answer.
Furthermore, one of the nine conditions in the definition of
“research” is that the research “not [be] used for any commercial
purpose.”77 On its face, such a condition is absurd. Taken literally,
that means that the scientific research involving the use of personal
information could never be used for any commercial purpose. If a
new drug is developed from such research, it could not be produced
or distributed by any company. If a new security method or
technology is developed from such research, private sector entities
could not use it to protect their data or that of their customers. If a
new clean energy source is developed from such research,
automakers could not incorporate it into their vehicles and
manufacturing processes. This condition, in effect, means that the
definition of “research” will apply to virtually no real-world
research.
Moreover, this condition conflicts with another definition within
the CCPA itself. The defined term “research” is used within the
definition of “business purpose.” Under the CCPA, “business
purpose” means a use of personal information for certain
“operational purposes, or other notified purposes,” 78 and the
definition provides several examples of business purposes including
“undertaking internal research for technological development and
demonstration.”79 So, “internal research” is a “business purpose,”
but “research” is defined in such a way that it must be noncommercial. But a business purpose is something carried out by a
business, so it’s inherently commercial. Thus, this example of a
business purpose only applies to non-commercial research carried
out for a commercial purpose. Such conflicts make the CCPA
definitions section remind one of a paradox Captain Kirk would give
to a malevolent computer to make it self-destruct. 80
Needless to say, the CCPA is not the ideal model for how a
77

Id. § 1798.140(s)(8).
Id. § 1798.140(d).
79
Id. § 1798.140(d)(6).
80
See, e.g., the Star Trek episodes Return of the Archons (NBC television
broadcast Feb. 9, 1967), I, Mudd (NBC television broadcast Nov. 3, 1967), and
The Ultimate Computer (NBC television broadcast Mar. 8, 1968).
78
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privacy law should define and address scientific research. The
definition of research is unclear, contradictory, and so narrow that it
would apply to little or no real-world research.
Fortunately, that poorly-drafted definition appears to have little
practical effect. The term “research” is used only twice in CCPA.
First, it creates an exception to consumers’ right to delete personal
information that is at best extraordinarily narrow and at worst
nonsensical. But there are other exceptions to the right to delete that
are extremely broad and are likely to make having to delete data
needed for any research purposes very rare. Second, it creates a
contradiction within the definition of “business purpose,” but which
has little or no effect on the use or sharing or personal information
for research purposes.
At the end of the day, the exceedingly narrow statutory
definition of “research” under the CCPA does not result in any
prohibition or restriction on the use or disclosure of personal
information for research purposes. The only case where such uses
and disclosures would be restricted is when a disclosure is deemed
a “sale” of personal information, a factor companies will want to
consider and perhaps take steps to design the data sharing
arrangement with an eye toward avoiding it being considered a sale.
Nevertheless, the numerous problems with how the “research”
definition is drafted could cause problems in the future if CCPA is
ever expanded to include things like a broad consent obligation for
data sharing, or if that definition is adopted or used in another
context that would impose significant restrictions in data uses and
disclosures that do not meet that definition.
PART III: COMMERCIAL VS. ACADEMIC RESEARCH
While privacy laws address and affect scientific research in
different ways, most have some provisions that make reasonable
allowances for research. Questions may arise regarding the
applicability of these provisions based on the purposes and nature of
the research being conducted. For example, where personal
information is used for research, there are a variety of possible
research purposes and a broad spectrum of uses ranging from the
purely academic to the purely commercial. Some research may be
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focused on promoting some widely–supported public interest
objective. Some academic research may simply be aimed at
advancing scientific knowledge. Some may be designed to develop
new technologies. Some may focus on developing or improving
commercial products or services. Some may be to study the safety
of a product or service. And some may be aimed at improving the
effectiveness of information or marketing messages provided to
consumers.
Common sense and practical experience may lead organizations
to conclude that regulators are likely to look more favorably upon
research purposes that are closer to the “purely academic” end of the
spectrum, or where a strong public benefit to the research can be
demonstrated. And in fact, the text of several privacy laws suggests
that lawmakers have shown a preference for research in the public
interest. For instance, under the CCPA, the research exception to the
right to delete requires that the research be in the public interest and
not for commercial purposes.81 And under the GDPR, the higher
level of restrictions on the processing of special categories of
sensitive personal data (including health data) don’t apply where the
“processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of
public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats
to health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health
care and of medicinal products or medical devices.” 82
However, it also appears that even within these laws that give
preference to research concerning issues of general public welfare,
the lines between academic and commercial research are not
determinative. As noted in Part II above, the problematic CCPA
definition that says research must be non-commercial conflicts with
how the term “research” is used elsewhere in CCPA in a purely
commercial context, and in any event, it has little practical effect. In
Europe, the GDPR includes a helpful recital that says: “For the
purposes of this Regulation, the processing of personal data for
scientific research purposes should be interpreted in a broad manner
including for example technological development and
demonstration, fundamental research, applied research and privately
81

CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.105(d)(6), 1798.140(s)(8). But see the problems
with that definition discussed in Part II.
82
GDPR, supra note 3 at 38.
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funded research.”83
Thus, the conclusions regarding permissible use, sharing, and
retention of personal information for research purposes may not be
fundamentally different for commercial research vs. purely
academic research under the laws addressed in this paper.84 Most
privacy laws provide leeway to allow for use of personal
information for scientific research, and in most or all cases, that
leeway extends to at least some commercial research.
That flexibility makes sense. After all, the lines between
academic or public-interest research and commercial research often
are not clear or obvious. Much academic research is leveraged for
beneficial commercial applications. And often, there are close
academic-commercial collaborations that make it possible to turn
research into, for example, mass-market drugs. Conversely, much
research performed by commercial entities promotes public
interests, such as advancing scientific knowledge and furthering
public health. Privacy law should allow for, and encourage, all such
research.
PART IV: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As policymakers draft new privacy laws, update existing privacy
laws, or develop guidance applying or interpreting privacy laws,
they must consider carefully how their laws, guidance, and
interpretations impact scientific research. Privacy laws should allow
for and encourage responsible use of personal information to
advance scientific knowledge and innovation. To overly burden the
use of personal information for research purposes is to foreclose the
possibility of such research and the many benefits that flow from
enabling it.
Particularly when incorporating principles such as consent, a
83

Id. Recital 159 at 30.
It is worth noting, however, that many uses of data flowing from research
for commercial purposes will raise additional legal obligations. For example, if
an output of research is a better algorithm for tailoring marketing messages to
consumers, the company wishing to send those tailored marketing messages will
need to comply with all the legal obligations that apply to direct marketing,
including initial consent, providing users the ability to stop receiving such
messages at any time, etc. Thus, organizations need to be aware of the regulatory
obligations applicable to all subsequent data uses.
84
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right to delete personal information, and notions of data
minimization, it is important that privacy laws include reasonable
and realistic exceptions for research. To that end, policymakers
should adopt the following recommendations:
 If a privacy law requires consent for certain uses or
disclosures of personal information, there must also be
practical alternatives to consent available.
 If a privacy law includes a right for individuals to request the
deletion of personal information, there must be an exception
available if the personal information is needed for research
purposes.
 If a privacy law includes a collection limitation principle,
collecting data needed for research purposes must be
considered an appropriate ground for collecting personal
information.
 If a privacy law includes a retention limitation principle,
retaining data needed for research purposes must be an
appropriate ground for retention.
 If a law addresses de-identification, the law should provide
incentives for its use of rather than imposing a mandate.
Further, such incentives should acknowledge that deidentification may not always be appropriate or compatible
with certain uses of personal information, including certain
research uses.
 Definitions of “research” and the ways the law addresses
research uses of personal information should not limit the
allowances for research to just “non-commercial” research,
but should instead be flexible and acknowledge that
commercial or privately-funded research can lead to the
same desirable outcomes as publicly-funded or purely
academic research.
Making such allowances for scientific research in privacy law
does not mean that privacy need be sacrificed. Other privacy
principles can provide protection while still allowing for research
uses of the data. Transparency can help create understanding of such
uses and provide for organizational accountability. Deidentification, when appropriately applied in a manner compatible
with the research purpose, can protect personal information and
reduce privacy risks. Data security is essential and can help ensure
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that personal information in a research context is protected from
unauthorized access and misuse.
Existing laws, such as the GDPR, include these types of
allowances for scientific research while still providing robust
privacy protections. By following these recommendations,
policymakers can strike an appropriate balance that enables and
encourages socially beneficial uses of personal date while protecting
the privacy of individuals.

